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1. Introduction 
On 4 October 2016, UK Defence Secretary Michael Fallon announced that the UK would 
derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in extraterritorial armed 
conflict.1 The derogation is alleged to protect troops from ‘vexatious claims’, create 
‘certainty’ in relation to the UK’s legal obligations abroad, and enable the Ministry of 
Defence to spend more money on equipment rather than legal fees.  According to Fallon, 
military personnel will still be bound by domestic criminal law and the Geneva Conventions 
on the battlefield. 2  These reforms are consistent with Conservative Party proposals for a new 
British Bill of Rights intended to ‘limit the reach of human rights cases to the UK, so that 
British Armed forces overseas are not subject to persistent human rights claims that 
undermine their ability to do their job and keep us safe’.3 This article first examines the claim 
that there is a need for a derogation by evaluating the UK’s obligations under the ECHR in 
extraterritorial armed conflict.4 It asks whether ECHR norms impose an untenable burden on 
UK forces, and whether criminal law or international humanitarian law can provide a more 
                                                 
1 Ministry of Defence and The Rt Hon Michael Fallon MP, ‘Government to protect Armed Forces from 
persistent legal claims in future overseas operations’ (Gov.UK, 4th October 2016) available at  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-to-protect-armed-forces-from-persistent-legal-claims-in-
future-overseas-operations> last accessed 25th October 2016.  
2 Ibid. 
3 ‘Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing Britain’s Human Rights 
Laws’ (The Conservative Party, 2014) 7 available at 
<file:///C:/Users/jr15181/Chrome%20Local%20Downloads/HUMAN_RIGHTS.pdf> last accessed 25th October 
2016.  
4 Hassan v UK (App No 29750/09),) judgment of 16 September 2014); Jaloud v Netherlands (2015) 60 
E.H.R.R. 29; Serdar Mohammed v Secretary of State for Defence [2015] EWCA Civ 843.  
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realistic benchmark for accountability in armed conflict. There is also consideration of the 
relationship between servicemen and women, and the ECHR.5 The article then considers 
whether derogations are legally possible and whether it will ensure lower standards of 
accountability, and decrease judicial scrutiny of British military activity abroad. Finally, the 
article concludes with an analysis of the symbolic value of a derogation and its political 
ramifications.  
UK obligations under the ECHR in extraterritorial armed 
conflict 
The right to life (art.2) and right to liberty and security (art.5) are the two main articles from 
which the government wishes to derogate.6 As Marko Milanovic has correctly asserted, it 
would be unfeasible for the UK to derogate from the art.3 protection against torture or art.6’s 
right of access to a court as part of a right to a fair trial.7 The Court’s treatment of the 
application of arts 5 and 2 to international armed conflict, and therefore its application to the 
UK in a foreign armed conflict, is set out below. 
Article 5 
Hassan v UK indicates that the Court interprets art.5 in armed conflict in light of the 
standards of the Geneva Conventions, and where the latter does not provide specific guidance 
on the issue, human rights law is used to fill in the gap. In dealing with the substantive aspect 
of art.5, the Court took into account the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions to conclude 
that art.5 could be interpreted as including internment without the requirement of a 
derogation because internment of Prisoners of War and detention of civilians who pose a 
threat to security were accepted features of international humanitarian law.8  
In terms of the procedural aspect of art.5, both art.5(2) and art.5(4) of the ECHR have to be 
interpreted in a manner which takes into account the context and applicable rules of the 
                                                 
5 Smith and Grady v UK (1999) 29 E.H.R.R. 493; Smith v The Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41. 
6 ‘UK troops to be protected from “spurious legal claims”’ (BBC, 4th October 2016) available at  
 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-37544280> last accessed 25th October 2016. 
7 Marko Milanovic, UK to Derogate from the ECHR in Armed Conflict’ (EJIL:talk! 5th October 2016) available 
at <http://www.ejiltalk.org/uk-to-derogate-from-the-echr-in-armed-conflict/#more-14616> last accessed 25th 
October 2016).  
8 Hassan (n 4) para 102. 
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Geneva Conventions.9 Article 5(2) and 5(4) of the ECHR provide that the state must inform 
the detainee promptly of the reasons for his arrest, and take proceedings to determine the 
lawfulness of the detention speedily by a court respectively. The Court noted that arts 43 and 
78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention stated that internment ‘shall be subject to periodical 
review, if possible every six months, by a competent body’.10 Whilst it may not have been 
‘practicable’ for the legality of detention to be determined by an independent ‘Court’ under 
art.5(4), the ‘competent body’ requirement under the Geneva Conventions was found to 
suffice for providing ‘impartiality and fair procedure to protect against arbitrariness’.11 A 
screening process in the form of two interviews by US and UK military intelligence officers 
was enough to meet the criteria of ‘competent body’. The Court also found that under art.5(2) 
the reasons would have become apparent to the individual as to why he was being detained, 
and therefore there was no violation.12 Hassan indicates that the ECHR does not impose 
untenable standards on troops and supports the proposition that the Geneva Convention 
should be enforced in armed conflict.  
Article 2 
In Jaloud v Netherlands, the Court was prepared to make reasonable allowances for the 
relatively difficult conditions under which states must carry out investigations into alleged 
illegal killings under art.2 right to life, namely that the Member State is in a foreign country 
which needs to be rebuilt in the aftermath of hostilities, with a different language and culture, 
and where the population can be hostile to the international military presence.13 In that 
decision, the Netherlands nevertheless failed to carry out an effective investigation because: 
a) important information had been withheld from judicial authorities and the applicant 
(a list of people present at the scene of the alleged killing, records of who fired shots 
at the time of the alleged killings);  
b) no precautions had been taken to prevent the accused Lieutenant from ‘colluding’ 
with other witnesses before he was questioned;  
c) the autopsy was not carried out to the standard required; and  
                                                 
9 Ibid para 106. 
10 Ibid para 106. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Jaloud (n 4) para 226. 
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d) important material evidence, including the bullet fragments taken from the victim’s 
body, were mislaid.14  
The accumulation of misdemeanours in the investigation meant that there was a violation of 
the procedural requirement to carry out an effective investigation. It is difficult to perceive 
this decision as imposing untenable standards on armed forces.  
 
An Untenable Burden? 
The Court therefore appears to take into account the Geneva Conventions when enforcing the 
ECHR in extraterritorial armed conflict. Francoise Hampson acknowledges the important role 
that international human rights courts can have in ensuring that states act in conformity with 
the Geneva Convention in the absence, or due to the failing of, existing mechanisms for 
enforcing international humanitarian law.15 The rhetoric that the ECHR enforces untenable 
standards on armed forces is therefore misleading, as the Court aims to hold states to account 
for failing to meet other international law obligations that are more specific to the context of 
armed conflict, and interprets human rights standards accordingly. Rather than act as a 
burden, human rights jurisprudence is instead considered when the Geneva Conventions fail 
to provide specific regulation on a matter. 
 
.  
 
Similarly, human rights law can be used by states within a mosaic of legal obligations. The 
UK Court of Appeal held the UK government accountable for failing to meet legal standards 
other than those set out in the ECHR through adjudication of the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA), which is domestic implementation legislation for the ECHR, in Serdar Mohammed v 
Ministry of Defence.16 The Court of Appeal found that the UK government was in violation 
of art.5 for the detention of a suspected Taliban Commander in Afghanistan for almost four 
                                                 
14 Ibid para 227. 
15 Francoise Hampson, ‘Using International Human Rights Machinery to Enforce the International Law of 
Armed Conflicts’ (1992) 31 Military Law & Law of War Review 11. 
16 Serdar Mohammed (n 4). The Serdar case is currently pending before the Supreme Court. See 
further, Jane Rooney, ‘A Legal Basis for Non-Arbitrary Detention: Serdar Mohammed v Secretary of State for 
Defence’ Public Law (forthcoming 2016).  
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months. The Court exposed the fact that the UK government’s detention policy had no legal 
basis in the International Security Assistance Force Standard Operating Procedure 362, the 
policy governing the activity of the NATO force in Afghanistan under which the UK.17  
Furthermore there was no legal basis in UK domestic law, Afghan domestic law or in 
international humanitarian law.18 It also exposed the fact that Mohammed’s detention and 
lack of procedural safeguards would have constituted a breach of international humanitarian 
law if it were applicable.19 
 
The ECHR and its application to the military 
Three points must be made on the relationship between servicemen and women, and the 
ECHR and the HRA.  
First, the ECHR imposes obligations on the UK government, and not individual soldiers for 
violations of human rights.20 The UK government must provide an ‘effective remedy’ under 
art.13 of the ECHR, which may take the form of compensation, an effective investigation, 
and/or legal proceedings prescribed by UK domestic law for holding individuals accountable 
for illegal activity in armed conflict.  
But even if the ECHR cannot be imposed against individual servicepersons, other regimes, 
seemingly ignored by Fallon, can. In terms of being concerned about individual 
accountability, Fallon failed to mention that in 2014 the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court re-opened investigations into alleged war crimes committed in Iraq by UK 
forces which would necessarily implicate individuals rather than merely the state. Nor was he 
concerned that international criminal law standards would affect the performance of armed 
forces abroad.21  
                                                 
17  Ibid paras 125-253.   
18 Ibid.   
19 Ibid paras 250, 298.   
20 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, ‘Different Human Rights at Home and Abroad: Immunity for British Soldier during 
Overseas Operations’ (Just Security, 5 October 2016) available at <https://www.justsecurity.org/33377/human-
rights-home-abroad-immunity-british-soldier-overseas-operations/> last accessed 25th October 2016. 
21 ICC, ‘Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, re-opens the preliminary examination 
of the situation in Iraq’ available at <https://www.icc-cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-iraq-13-05-
2014> last accessed 25 October 2016. 
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Second, UK military personnel have benefited from the protection of the ECHR/HRA by 
ensuring accountability for the conduct of the Ministry of Defence.22  In Smith v Ministry of 
Defence two sets of claims were brought against the Ministry of Defence: the ‘Challenger 
claims’ and the ‘Snatch Land Rover claims’. The ‘Challenger claims’ were negligence claims 
in respect of the death of one party and the injury of two others, which occurred during a 
friendly fire incident in a Challenger II tank taking part in the offensive on Basra in 2003. 
The ‘Snatch Land Rovers’ claims alleged that the Ministry of Defence was in breach of the 
obligation to safeguard life protected by ECHR art.2 due to failing to take reasonable 
measures in light of the real and immediate risk of soldiers with patrolling obligations. In 
both instances, the government was found to have failed to provide adequate equipment for 
the protection of soldiers’ lives. In particular, Snatch Land Rovers had no protection against 
improvised explosive devices, and although withdrawn from the battlefield as the result of the 
death of soldiers seven months previous to the incident in question, were re-introduced 
without further enquiry. Furthermore, the ECHR enabled military personnel who were 
dismissed from the armed forces on the grounds of their sexuality to sue the government 
under art.8 in the case of Smith and Grady v UK.23  
Third, investigations of suspected breaches of law are in the interests of the military itself. As 
Noam Lubell and Daragh Murray note, ‘[b]y ensuring accountability where necessary, by 
disproving baseless allegations, and by demonstrating a commitment to the rule of law, the 
armed forces publicly demonstrate their integrity and professionalism – and ensure the 
public’s trust’.24  
Can Derogations be made extraterritorially? 
Under art.15, a state can derogate from the ECHR if there is a ‘public emergency threatening 
the life of the nation’ and the measures taken to address that emergency must be ‘strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation’. The state is afforded a wide margin of 
                                                 
22 Smith v The Ministry of Defence (n 5). 
23 Smith and Grady (n 5). 
24 Noam Lubell and Daragh Murray, ‘Why human rights law is not a threat to the British armed forces’ (The 
Conversation, 4th October 2016) available at 
<https://theconversation.com/why-human-rights-law-is-not-a-threat-to-the-british-armed-forces-66504> last 
accessed 25th October 2016.  
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appreciation or degree of discretion for determining whether an emergency exists.25  
However, ‘life of the nation’ is given a much more limited interpretation and it is doubted 
that this expands extraterritorially. Sometimes it is confined to a smaller geographical area 
within the state, but its definition has not exceeded the territorial boundaries of a state. 26 
 Commentators have mixed opinions. Marko Milanovic argues that the ‘life of the nation’ 
refers to the extraterritorial territory over which the Member State has control rather than an 
emergency taking place on UK territory.27 Campbell McLachlan argues it is politically 
unjustified for occupying powers to issue a derogation. Given that a derogation arises only in 
‘an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency’,28 a derogation should not apply if the state 
has ‘elected’ to take part in military operations abroad and effectively made the foreign 
nation state, beyond its own internal control, a state of emergency.29  
The Court signalled in Banković v Belgium that an extraterritorial derogation may be possible 
if states act in the belief that it is possible to derogate abroad, but that no such indication has 
been given so far.30 This was corroborated by the Court in Hassan wherein it relied upon 
art.31(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 to establish whether 
‘subsequent practice’ of states had indicated that a derogation was required in order for art.5 
to be interpreted as including internment in armed conflict as an exception to the right to 
liberty and security.31 It would therefore appear that an extraterritorial derogation under the 
ECHR is not impossible as its existence appears to rely on the behaviour and belief of states, 
as well as what they deem to be a state of emergency, regardless of where that is situated. 
The scrutiny and effect of an extraterritorial derogation. 
While a wide margin of appreciation is accorded to states in determining whether there is a 
state of emergency justifying a derogation, greater scrutiny is given as to whether the 
                                                 
25 See eg A v UK  (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 29 
26 Sakik v Turkey (1998) 26 E.H.R.R. 662. 
27 Marko Milanovic, ‘Extraterritorial Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in Armed Conflict’ in Nehal 
Bhuta (ed), The Frontiers of Human Rights: Extraterritoriality and its Challenges (OUP 2016) 68-73. 
28 Lawless v Ireland (no 3) (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 15  para 28. 
29 Campbell McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law (CUP 2014) 334. 
30 Banković v Belgium (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. SE5 para 62. 
31 Hassan (n 4) para 101.  
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measures are strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.32 A test of proportionality is 
adopted for determining whether the measures which interfere with human rights protection 
effectively address the national security issue at hand, and interferes with rights no more than 
is necessary.33  The Court’s approach to applying the ECHR in armed conflict looks to the 
Geneva Conventions to determine what measures are necessary and not necessary in armed 
conflict, to strike the balance between military necessity and protection of civilians and 
combatants. Under a derogation, the Court will continue to look to other international legal 
standards pertaining to the situation to inform their understanding of what is necessary in the 
context. Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aolain argue that greater judicial scrutiny should apply 
in states of emergencies as compared with times of peace, especially in extended periods of 
derogations from the ECHR.34 The 2003-2008 occupation of Iraq and the UK presence in 
Afghanistan from 2001-2014 would surely attract great judicial scrutiny if a derogation had 
been issued in respect of either military interventions. Therefore, the intention of the 
government to decrease judicial scrutiny would not be achieved through lodging a 
derogation. 
Political Ramifications 
An extraterritorial derogation under the ECHR may be possible, as it appears to rely 
primarily on state practice and belief, and a wide margin of appreciation is accorded to states 
in determining when there is a state of emergency. In saying that, a derogation from the 
ECHR may be merely of ‘symbolic’ significance if it, in fact, does not change the way in 
which the Court adjudicates upon extraterritorial armed conflict and it continues to take into 
account other international and domestic legal obligations relevant to the situation, and 
possibly enhances judicial scrutiny of those cases.  
However, the symbolism of the derogation should be scrutinised both in terms of its domestic 
and international ramifications. Domestically, the statements made by the Defence Minister 
may have a chilling effect on those engaging in human rights litigation relating to 
extraterritorial armed conflict. Indeed, the Law Society President warned that ‘[l]awyers must 
not be hindered or intimidated in carrying out their professional duties and acting in the best 
                                                 
32 A v UK (n 25). 
33 Paul Craig, Administrative Law (4th ed Sweet and Maxwell, 1999) 590-91. 
34 Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aolain, ‘From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the Application of the Margin 
of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 ECHR’ (2001) 23(3) Human Rights Quarterly 635. 
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interests of their clients within the law’.35 Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Mercer, the former 
chief legal adviser for the Army in Iraq said it was wrong ‘simply to polarise it as money-
grabbing lawyers’ noting that the government had paid out £20 million for 326 cases that 
were proven to be legitimate cases concerning human rights abuses by UK armed forces.36 
Undermining or condemning the efforts of those who help hold the UK accountable in 
legitimate cases for rights violations committed abroad undermines freedom of expression, 
democratic accountability, and securing the UK’s international status as a rights-abiding 
state. Fortunately, a derogation means that the government implicitly accepts the 
extraterritorial application of the ECHR, thus contributing to the de-territorialisation of 
accountability, and ensuring that double standards do not persist in relation to what states do 
on their territory and do outside of their territory. However, extraterritorial derogations create 
a new symbolic double standard, a hardening of territory once again, whereby the state is 
held to account for one set of obligations on its own territory and a different set abroad. This 
undermines a commitment to ensuring that UK actors are not perceived as ‘gentlemen at 
home, hoodlums elsewhere’.37 As Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou points out, Russian media very 
quickly observed that the UK had decided to exempt troops from the ECHR to stop 
‘annoying’ claims.38 The UK’s ability to derogate from international commitments abroad 
may mean that accusations against Russia for ECHR violations may no longer have the same 
political purchase as before.39 
The proposal for a derogation sends a signal to those within the UK that human rights have 
only served to undermine national security and hamper the effectiveness of military 
interventions abroad. This feeds into a broader narrative of anti-human rights rhetoric which 
                                                 
35 [https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/news/press-releases/law-society-comment-on-legal-cases-against-uk-troops-
in-iraq/] 
36 ‘UK troops to be protected from “spurious legal claims”’ (n 6).  
37 Al Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 18 Concurring Opinion Judge Bonello. 
38 ‘Human rights no more? UK to exempt troops from European Convention to stop ‘annoying’ claims’ (Russia 
Today 4 October 2016) available at <https://www.rt.com/uk/361516-human-rights-convention-troops/> last 
accessed 25th October 2016. 
39 Alexandra Sims, ‘Vladimir Putin signs law allowing Russia to ignore international human rights rulings’ 
(The Independent, 15 December 2015) available at 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/vladimir-putin-signs-law-allowing-russian-court-to-
overthrow-international-human-rights-rulings-a6773581.html> last accessed 25th October 2016.  
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does not celebrate the ability of judicial enforcement of human rights to empower individuals 
to hold the state accountable for its actions within the domestic territory and abroad. It instead 
turns people against human rights as it is conveyed as an instrument for facilitating the enemy 
and the other. Therefore, it is imperative that resistance is shown towards a derogation 
because the impact of its symbolism should not be underestimated. There needs to be a fair 
portrayal of ECHR adjudication on the armed forces in the absence of a derogation, and 
continual reminder that human rights serve to buttress UK democracy and the rule of law.   
